Tins MAIN PURPOSE OF TinS PAPER is to offer an exposition and a critical examination of the ancient interpretations of Aristotle's doctrine of homonym. A circumlocution of what Aristotle means by homonym things is given in Categories, Ch. I I a. The ancient interpretations with which we are concerned in this paper are to be found in the extant commentaries on this treatise. Evidently, more commentaries had been written on the Categories than the vicissitudes of time allowed to survive, but we have only those of the following writers: Porphyrius (c: 233-303), Dexippus (ft. c. 350), Ammonius (ft. C. 485), , Olympiodorus (ft. c. 535), $implicius (ft. c. 533), Elias (ft. c. 550). One might add here the relevant writings of John Damascene (675-749), Photius (820-891), and Michael Psellus (1018-1079), which are useful paraphrases rather than full commentaries; for that reason the interpretations they support are not discussed in this paper.
(ft. c. 535), $implicius (ft. c. 533), Elias (ft. c. 550). One might add here the relevant writings of John Damascene (675-749), Photius (820-891), and Michael Psellus (1018-1079), which are useful paraphrases rather than full commentaries; for that reason the interpretations they support are not discussed in this paper.
The main body of this paper is given to a discussion of the interpretations which the ancient commentators offered and to an analysis of the assumptions which underlie them. It can be stated here in anticipation of what follows that the commentators often attached to Aristotle's meaning of homonyma aspects that were quite foreign to his views and that by doing so these commentators were taking extensive liberties with the text at hand. As we hope to show, the commentators brought into their discussions of this particular portion of the Categories issues and views that were far more relevant to their own ontologies and logical theories than to Aristotle's doctrines. In order to show how this is the case, we must first give a summary of what we believe our text permits us to say about the meaning of homonym, as given in the opening chapter of the Categories. ~ Suffice it to add This is the second of a two-part article. This part is based on an invited paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy in New York City, Dec. 27, 1965. a For a full discussion of the doctrine of homonyma and the background against which it can be understood, see my "The Aristotelian Doctrine of Homonyma in the Categories and its Platonic Antecedents," in the last number of this journal (VI, 4 [Oct., 1968], 315-326) . I tried to show in that paper how Aristotle's formulation is indebted linguistically to Plato but was worked out not in response to Plato's usage but to his own philosophical position and as part of his logical apparatus to attack the Speusippean wing of the Academy. On the whole, the textual evidence from the Platonic writings indicates clearly that Plato had not proposed a technical use of homonyma. Speusippus and Aristotle, however, offered two different and opposing technical formulations intended to fit their respective ontologies.
[H 2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY at this point that the interpretations of the doctrine of homonyma with which we are concerned here are only those that are discussed exclusively in the relevant commentaries on this work.
Textual tradition has preserved two versions, referred to here as Vl and 3/2, of Aristotle's formulation of homonyma. The difference between them is that while V1 preserves the key expression ),d,yJ~ .~ o6~(~, the other, V2, omits it. V1, as established by modern textual criticism, reads:
'Ol~6wtzce My~'~cct ~o~ ~vollQc ,~6vo~ xow~, 6 ~ xc~Sc ~o~vo~cc M'l,o~ ~ o6~(c~; ~'~po;.
Not only did we defend the inclusion of the expression logos t~s ousias (here- after abbreviated as L of O) as indispensable for distinguishing Aristofle's formulation from the one propounded by Speusippus, but we also found it necessary to advance the view that Aristotle used the expression L of O in a definitely technical sense. We showed why the deletion of the term ousia would make the passage open to misinterpretation, since by omitting it one could argue that Aristofle meant to include in the class of homonyma such things as accidental properties and individuals with proper names. We also argued in favor of a view that delimits the meaning of ousia to definable substance, i.e., in the sense of secondary substance as species. Textual evidence in favor of this reading was cited from other treatises and the case was further strengthened by arguing that the meaning of the term logos in the sense of "definition" left no doubt that the proper application of the term could only refer to ousia as essence. The conclusion we drew was that the formulation of homonyma in V1 suited perfectly the ontological doctrine put forth in the Categories and also that each term occurring in the total expression was employed in a precise terminological way. When we turn to the philosophical value of the extant commentaries on the Categories, three special problems deserve attention: (1) We must know whether each commentator shows sufficient awareness of the technical terminology in which the doctrine of homonyma is couched and hence whether he phrases his interpretation of the doctrine in line with what seems to be the most acceptable reading of the text. (2) Given the way each commentator understands what is meant by homonyma things, it is imperative that we identify the implications each particular formulation has for a theory of substance and definition to which the commentators subscribe.
(3) Since the miscellaneous materials which the commentators incorporate into their discussions are quite frequently alien to the issues at hand and since their expositions cover grounds not intended by Aristotle's own theory of homonyma, we must identify the intellectual affiliations of the commentators and uncover the logical and ontological views they seek to promote through Aristotle's authority. The ancient commentators failed to appreciate the full technical import of the expression L of O. The reasons for this failure seem to be many. One of them is the tendency to over-explicate not merely each of the terms separately, but also the expression as a whole. When we turn to the non-Aristotelian considerations the commentators introduced in their discussion, we see that the outstanding example is that of taking logos to mean both definition and description. Now the latter is dearly an interpolation and is to be found nowhere in the Categories. However, by talcing such liberties with the meaning of the term logos, the commentators were ARISTOTELIAN HOMONYMA 3 able to change the meaning of the whole expression and to force it to appear nontechnical. As a result, the denotation of the definiendum "'homonyma things" became so wide as to include anything from accidental properties and first substances to highest genera, including the genera of prediction. By repeatedly emphasizing this broad interpretation of homonyma, the commentators turned their backs to the possibility that Aristotle could have intended the term in a limited sense and therefore given the expression L of O a technical meaning. Thus when we leave the commentaries to return to Aristotle's own text, we are hardly surprised to see that there was no plan on his part to discuss all types of homonyma things.
Apparently Aristotle and the commentators were not doing the same thing. He also mentions a fifth type, paronyma, which refers to things whose names are the result of derivation; however, he considers it of little importance. Porphyry explains Aristotle's omission of (3) and (4) on the ground that he had no real use for either.
The next question he raises is addressed to the reason why Aristotle began the treatise with the statement on homonyma (61 4tD. It should be noted that the explanation he gives finds no support in the Categories and must be regarded as Porphyry's own invention. In any event, Porphyry claims that Aristotle believed that the categories themselves, when predicated of things, are used homonymously.
His explanation is prefaced with the remark that Aristotle taught that being (to on) is homonymous.' Hence, Porphyry argues, Aristotle should have begun with the In Categ., be~nnlng with 60 l 1. s Comp. Porphyry's remark in the Isagoge (6 5-11): "... being is not the common genus of all things, nor, as Aristotle says, are all things of the same genus with respect to one summum genus. Still, let the first ten genera be arranged, as in the Categories, as ten first principles, and even if a person should call all things beings, yet he will call them, as he says, equivocally, but not synonymously, for if being were the one common genus of all things, all things would be synonymously styled beings, but the first principles being ten, the community is in name only, yet not in the definition also belonging to the name: there are then ten most generic genera" (The Organon, or (definition, oral speech, reckoning, seminal reason, etc.) , and if we fail to make ousia part of the expression, the real meaning of logos, i.e., in the sense of definition, becomes obscure (64 28-65 11). In a preceding comment on the inadmissibility of the elliptical variant logos heteros, vis-a-vis that of kata tounoma logos . . . heteros, he correctly defends the fuller version (contra Speusippus?) by pointing out that the accuracy of meaning demands it be made clear here that it is not the name which is the referent, but something else in conjunction with the name.' What he means is that only the fuller version expresses Aristotle's point: the denotation of a name used and the denotation of the definition of the substance named must be the same. ' The first sign of Porphyry's deviation from Aristotle's meaning appears with the listing of the diverse uses of logos. It is obvious that some of them are totally foreign to Aristotle. But the initial suspicion we form that Porphyry is about to mis-9 interpret the text is eventually confirmed when he proceeds to give the example which illustrates his discussion of the logic of homonymy. The point is that theory and example are incompatible. The illustration he mentions is two human beings with the same name: Ajax (son of Telamon) and Ajax (son of Oileus). The definition of "man" applies to both, and though they have the same (proper) name they are not the same entities. Still the definition of the substance underlying the name "man" is true for both Ajaxes. Next Porphyry tells us that the only way we can logically differentiate between the two is by resorting to different descriptions.
By advocating this solution Porphyry abandons the strict approach to homonyma and in effect widens the term to denote also such things as the homonymous accidental properties. The terminology is shifted to accommodate a very special case: homonymous individuals.
If our thesis is correct, it follows that Aristotle's doctrine was not intended to cover homonymy due to proper names. If so, Porphyry is illicitly extending the 9 Porphyry's explanation is interesting and deserves notice. Beginning with line 13, he process to explain his views which may be summarized as follows: Since there is a distinction betwcen homonymy as a notion (phon~) and things (pragmata) which are homonyma, we cannot really talk about homonymy unless the claim can be made that we already know that things are ordered in a variety of ways and that all do not partake in the same definition. The cause of homonymy, then, lies in the fact that things are found to be different and that they are such that do not share the same name. Without this sort of knowledge, Porphyry remarks, we cannot conceive of homonymy. * Porphyry offers the foUowing examples of the two definitions of the substance denoted by the name "'man": 1) ~0pto~or ~ov ),oTtx6~ 0v~d~.
2) ,~vOpto~or o6~ia ~.~.6ugor aieO~tx~.
The problem now becomes one of determining whether the two definitions have the same denotation. Since Df. 2 denotes not only men but also other things such as oxen and the like, the equivalence is cancelled, and one of the two definitions is declared too wide. Porphyry's rule is that a term is correctly rendered not only when properly named but also when defined in conjunction with the proper denotation of the name. initial use of the theory. The departure is so radical that it permits the term "homonyma" to refer to named species as well as individuals with proper names. Once the two views, Aristotle's and Porphyry's, are allowed to come under the formulation of homonyma as stated in the Categories, that formulation becomes at once imprecise and inconsistent; imprecise, on the ground that L of O is no longer a technical expression, and inconsistent because the term logos, in the sense of definition, is now taken to apply to both definable and non-definable things.
Porphyry's special scholium on L of 0 is quite revealing. He admits that in view of the many uses of logos the expression t3s ousias is needed in order to make clear that it is the defining sense of logos that concerns Aristotle (64 28-11). Thus, he infers, the defining logos (horistikos) which refers to the name and logos which indicates substance (ousias d3lStikos) are the same thing, except in the case of homonyma things where the definition of substance must be different in each case.
Two critical reservations must be made at this point. (1) Porphyry is simply assuming that Aristotle had in mind the problem of the homonymy of the term Iogos and that ousia was made part of the expression primarily to avoid this particular ambiguity. Aside from the obvious anachronism about the Stoic seminal reason as one of the senses of Iogos, the list of meanings is too elementary if not irrelevant to the discussion. As a result, the explication appears contrived, and the conclusions drawn far from acceptable. (2) Though Porphyry is correct in taking logos to mean definition, he is far from clear as to the meaning of pragmata. Strict Aristotelian doctrine would demand identification of pragmata with definable species. However, Porphyry shows no sign of having detected here that a real ontological issue arises when the emphasis is shifted from species to individuals, an issue which touches on the very philosophical framework of syllogistic thinking. As we said in the previous section, the referents to homonyma and synonyma are substances which are both definable and predicable; they are the things which normally serve as terms in the premises of the syllogism.
Just the same, confident that he has settled the problem of the meaning ot homonyma, he proceeds next to consider the issue of their tropes. His list of tropes (65 12if) has many merits to it, but again it turns out that it is geared to the discussion on the homonymy which is due to proper names. He lists two main tlopes:' homonyma by accident (apo tych~s), and homonyma by intention (apo dianoias). The latter is further divided into four classes: from (1) similarity, (2) analogy, (3) unity to multiplicity, (4) multiplicity to unity. Once again, the examples used to illustrate homonyma by accident leave no doubt that he was thinking of homonyma pragrnata not in terms of Aristotelian secondary substances but in the light of the paradigmatic case of individuals with proper names. 9 What he failed to realize here is that his proposed tropes, though theoretically interesting, were explained with the aid of illustrations that could not be accommodated within
The same division is adopted by Olympiodorus (In Categ. 34ff~). 9 An example of accidental homonyma is the case of two unrelated individuals who have been given the same proper name but without any design or planning on the part of those who gave them the name. Consider, e.g., the case of two Alexanders: Alexander, the son of Priamus, and Alexander, the son of Philippus.
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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the strict Aristotelian context of L of O, which, as Porphyry himself admits, require that loges be taken in the sense of definition. It is the kind of examples he offers that leads us to conclude that Porphyry did not suspect he was actually taking liberties with the text before him and that he was expressing views that violated the intent of the Aristotelian doctrine. It seems really strange that he did not observe that his and Aristotle's paradigms were at odds,' nor for that reason did any of the subsequent commentators. They all repeated Porphyry's error. Throughout the history of the ancient commentary practice, the source of misinterpretation remained unidentified and the error was never removed, let alone suspected.
2) Dexippus' interpretation: ~~ He prefaces his comments on homonyma with a discussion on what can be legitimately considered a "category," and proposes that the following sorts of expressions be disqualified: (1) metaphors, (2) tropes, e.g., necessity, possibility, subsistence, and (3) modifiers, e.g., all, none, no one in partic. ular, etc. The criterion he employs for rejecting such expressions is that the things they stand for have no determinate nature of their own (12 20-25)? ~ Next he proceeds to show why certain principles which cannot be subsumed under any of the categories are nevertheless highly relevant to categorial theory; since they have as many uses as there are categories, such principles are cases of homonymyY The third problem he considers before presenting his interpretation of homonyma concerns is the reason why Aristotle chose to discuss homonyma, synonyma, and paronyma rather than proceed directly with the theory of categories. In giving an answer to this question he allows the discussion to sidetrack to what turns out to be an interesting bit of linguistic theory. He remarks that things and names of things, considered as quantitative collections, are not commensurable. In some cases we have more words for the same thing, whereas in others we have more things than names available for them. Hence in considering any given simple or non-composite word, it is necessary to determine under which of the categories it should be classified. It is on account of this peculiar relationship between words and things that, according to Dexippus, Aristotle prefaced his treatise with a brief analysis on homonyma and synonyma. Unt Porphyry's illustrations of each type within the trope of intentional homonyma are particularly suited to his classifications. The type of intentional trope which is of special interest to Porphyry is that from similarity. According to his interpretation, Aristotle's own examples mentioned in Categories, la, are based on the trope from similarity (66 22-8). Man and painting of man are homonyma by virtue of the fact that both are called "living," except that the painting of man is called so from similarity. This is also reflected in the language in which Porphyry couched the definitions of these homonyma things: fortunately Dexippus does not discuss the issue in any detail. Instead he returns to his previous point and offers the peculiar hypothesis that the real reason Aristotle opened the Categories with a formulation of the nature of homonyma is because the ten categories are themselves instances of homonyma (17 25-29) . His point is that each category is predicated synonymously of the species subsumed under it, and that the categories, if taken absolutely, are used homonymously. Ignoring for a moment Dexippus' numerous irrelevancies, we must pause to mention that, like Porphyry, he also gives serious attention to homonyma in the context of individual substances with the same proper name. This is readily seen in his paradigm of the two Ajaxes. Notwithstanding his uncritical adoption of Porphyry's interpretation, it should be noted that Dexippus was quicker in accepting the implications of that approach for the total widening of the denotation of homonyma pragmata. Thus Dexippus promptly included the accidental properties. Evidently this is in agreement with the theory that homonymy is obtainable in all the categories. However what is not clear from his discussion is the extent to which he was aware of the liberties he was taking with the text.
Though I, It is clear that Ammonius is convinced that in this context Aristotle did not mean substance in the sense in which it is contrasted to accidents (o~ '~ ~v~tStr ~p~r ,:k aulz~zdz=), but rather in the wider sense that would permit us to include particular existents, that is, primary ousiai. It follows from this, his argument goes, that Aristotle's view of homonyma must be understood as designed to cover the accidental properties as well. If
Aristotle did not mean his theory to cover that case, he would have said ?dar162 ~xd~ou x,~0' ~'~ ~01o't~xEv... rather than t~s ousias. Ammonius' speculations receive no support from the text. We are dealing here with a strained interpretation, but one that enables Ammonius to take loges to mean hypograph#, description, and ousia to stand for accidental properties as well. Evidently, Elias is following almost to the letter both Porphyry and Ammonius when he states with unusual succinctness the difference between definition and description: So far he has said nothing to justify the relevance of the discussion on description to Aristotle's text. What controls the analysis is Porphyry's insistence that description is part of the meaning of logos. One suspects here that Ammonius is accommodating Aristotle to Porphyry's theories rather than the reverse. He quotes Porphyry's dictum to the effect that "Things we cannot signify through definition we like to indicate through description" (55 12-13). No sooner do we ask what are the things to which Porphyry's dictum refers than we discover that included in the class of such "tmdefinables" are, next to the accidental properties, the highest genera. Hence Ammonius agrees with Porphyry, they are accessible only through description. But the point of real interest is that he explains the undefinability of highest genera on the familiar grounds that there is no genus higher to them and that they are cases of homonyma (56 1). The syllogism is clear: Since all homonyma are undefinable, and highest genera are homonyma, all such genera are undefinable? s But the signilieant thing here is that the undefinability of all homonyma was never defended by Aristotle. The only alternative is to conclude that Ammonius is expounding on Porphyry's doctrines. If his thesis claims to cover Aristotle's view on homonyma as well, the consequence is that it degenerates into ~s The definition of man, which is the illustration he uses, is taken word for word from Porphyry as given in In Categ. 60 17-8. zs It is reasonable to conclude that Ammonins did not see that the position which he took in his In Porph. lsag. contradicted what be said in the In Categ. In the lsagoge he asserted the undefinability of all homonyma, and this, he insisted, holds true of Aristotle's own categorial theory where it deals with homonyma. If so, then he should have said that logos, since it refers to homonyma pragmata, can mean only description. In other words, Amrnonius commits a contradiction when on the one hand he asserts the undeflnabiliW of all homonyma and, on the other, that logos in the context of the Categories can mean both description and definition. He states in the Isagoge: x~ov ~-6~vr~tov o~x ~t 6'po~r ~o~o~v~t... 6 8" ~p,~W~,r =t~v ~Ftov'SV.~v Ev" xo:v~v 6~t~rp.~v &~o~o~v"t (56 2-6"). a contradictory explanation of two incompatible theories. It is unfortunate that Ammonius neglected to state the difference between Porphyry's and Aristotle's respective approaches to homonyma. There are other special features in Ammonius' theory of description, but they cannot be included in this study. Had this been done we could have shown how Ammonius' neoplatonic idealism prevented him from cutting through the maze of Porphyry's philosophical assumptions to determine for himself whether Aristotle's text permitted the expansion of the meaning of homonyma to suit Porphyry's non-Axistotelian ontology. 4) Philoponus" interpretation: He opens his discussion on homonyma with a pious bit of theological epistemology. Had we been blessed, he remarks, with the being only naked souls have and were free from the bondage of our bodies, we would be able to signify everything by means of concepts only. However, bodies act like clouds, cover the intelligibles and intervene with our seeing them directly.
This is the reason why we need names (In Categ. 14 lff.). Since it is not given to us to signify through concepts, we enlist the help of names and definitions (horismo,').
Next he proceeds to give a brief account of homonyma, synonyma, polyonyma, and heteronyma and states that he means by homonyma things which "share the name but differ according to the definition." He makes an effort to explain why Aristotle did not refer to all four kinds of signified things. The answer he gives is that Aristotle "potentially" spoke of the other two as well, because to know a homonymon, for instance, is to know potentially its opposite, the polyonymon (14 24ff.). He also has an answer to the much discussed question why Aristotle decided to begin this work with a statement on homonyma. These things, he informs us, are actually the simplest sort, for they share one aspect only--the name; therefore, they are by nature (physeO prior to the synonyma. In fact, being (to on) is predicated of the categories homonymously, not synonymously. Philoponus, following the example of the preceding commentators, is asking questions for which he has put answers. The explanations he provides are at once debatable and irrelevant. Philoponus' explanation is not the only one that can be given to the last question, and more significantly, it is not basically related to the logical context of Aristotle's formulation of homonyma. One can not escape forming the impression that Philoponus is misled into believing that Aristotle is referring indiscriminately to all instances of homonyma, including "being" as a homonym6s legomenon. Be that as it may, Philoponus burdens his discussion with a number of trivial themes (15 lift.), only tO tell us what the real meaning of the opening lines is: "Let it be understood that Aristotle tells us directly in the opening statement what the purpose of the book is. He says "homonyma legatai....' What he means by 'homonyma' is things, and by "legatai; significant sounds (phonaO. We know things with the aid of conceptual meanings (no~mata)."" That Philoponus is straining the intent of the passage is evident from his insistence upon making the homonymy of a concept, including the concept of homonymy, a foremost and necessary part of the formulation of homonyma pragmata. If we keep in mind that it is this interest that dominates his itemized kind of commentary, we ar Philoponi, In Categ. 16 15-8.
are in a better position to understand why he takes special pain to explicate homonymon as being itself a homonymous expression?' More pertinent to our discussion is his comment on "legatai." His interpretation is that the subject of the verb is pragmata. The point is that Aristotle is actually referring to things, not concepts. Aside from the problem Philoponus has in tying this pointed explication to his previous tangential remarks on homonymy in general, he falls into the serious and repeated error of offering the Ajax paradigm (17 26ff.), and to make matters worse, he tries to support it through a remarkable showpiece of irrelevant erudition: a line from Plato's Phaedrus." Since most of the comments on the itemized textual expressions are rather trivial, it is best that we give some attention to what is basic to our theme: his understanding of pragmata. Once again, the paradigm is individuals with the same proper name. The discussion is tied to the reasons he gives for preserving in the text the expression kata tounoma. The reading is justified, he thinks, because certain things which are homonyma with regard to one name are not so with regard to another name. Since two things may have more than one name in common, such things may turn out to be now homonyma, now synonyma. Hence it should be plain, Philoponus argues, that Aristotle specifically meant to alert us to the need for restricting the definition called for only to that common name by virtue of which the things are homonyma and not any other. It would be tedious to give here the details of his analysis of the example of the two Ajaxes. What matters really is the nature of the paradigm. Aside from his questionable interpretation of the intent of the aforementioned part of the total passage, there is the further issue of the paradigm. It is here where Philoponus misunderstands the meaning of the passage. What strikes the reader is Philoponus' reluctance to as much as mention Aristotle's own examples. Instead he follows the previous commentators and supplies the illicit example of individuals with the same proper name. We have already seen what consequences follow from this sort of interpretation of pragmata. What we should look for next is the inconsistent view Philoponus is inadvertently forced to adopt. This matter hinges on his understanding of logos.
Like the other commentators, Philoponus' answer is part of his broader treatment of L ol O. He defends the expression but interprets it as follows. Aristotle said logos and not horismos in order to cover cases of homonyma which are beyond proper definitions (19 21ft.). He repeats the familiar theory of descriptions as the only avenue to signification of summa genera and accidental properties. In short, logos means here definition and description of substance. He argues that since Aristotle used "substance" to mean something self-existent, in contrast to accidents, and also any "absolutely existing entity," the accidents are thereby part 1. The point is that Philoponus purports to alert his reader to the fact that the term "homonymon" has many senses. He adopts Porphyry's two main tropes of homonyma and introduces certain minor changes in the types of intentional homonyma. Actually, all he does is to replace Porphyry's class of homonyma from similarity with two sub-classes, each related I2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY of the meaning of "'ousia" in the passage. The surprising aspect of his discussion comes with his comment on Cat. la 4, for he gives there the impression he has forgotten what was already said about logos, and unaware of the inconsistency into which he is about to fall, he declares that Aristotle is asking in this passage for the definition of the species. In this respect he is doing nothing substantially different from what Ammonius did before him~ What is of real interest, however, is the fact that he did not perceive the inconsistency in his interpretation, an inconsistency which would have been easier for him to detect, since it did not originate with him. For all these reasons, Philoponus' commentary on the problem of homonyma is pronouncedly inferior to that of Ammonius. 5) Olympiodorus' interpretation: What he says on the subject is not radically different from any previous treatment of homonyma, but his commentary is interesting as a variant misinterpretation. He also defends the reading of L of O and comparably takes Iogos to mean both definition and description. In a general introductory comment (26 5ff.), he tells us that homonyma arise from the fact that each thing is at once one and many; as unity it has a name, as plurality it is signified through logos, which is of two kinds. By combining name and logos, we arrive at four classes of things: homonyma, synonyma, heteronyma, polyonyma. His treatment of homonyma presents no novel features, and the illustrations are the standard ones of the two Ajaxes (27 10-20) . What is of particular interest is the facility with which he ignores his own terminology. For instance, after mentioning his example of the two Ajaxes as cases of homonyma, he does not hesitate to use the term definition (horisraos), despite the fact that these are individuals. He seems convinced that he is actually giving definitions when he says, e.g., Ajax, son of Telamon: "from Salamis, who fought a duel with Hector and committed suicide."
For his answer to why Aristotle treated only homonyma and synonyma but began with the former, he borrows heavily from Philoponus (27 25ff.). His main points are that the categories are the most inclusive genera (genik~tata) , that the species which come under them are all synonyma, and that "being" is predicated homonymously of all the categories. There are two sorts of confusion in this portion of Olympiodorus commentary: (1) While emphasizing the synonymous character of the kinds of things subsumed under each category, he loses sight of the real differences between the sub-categorial sets. Olympiodorus the grammarian has evidently misled the ontologist. (2) Like the others he also assumes that Aristotle's starting point and main concern of the chapter is "being" as pollach~s legomenon. 2.
2, The reason, he says, Aristotle begins with the homonyma is because they are the simplest things, meaning that they have only one thing in common, unlike the synonyma which have two. This, he argues, is as it should be, for the simple must always pre~de the complex. Furthermore it just so happens that the most general thing is itself a homonymon: "I speak here of to on .... [hence] the theory of homonyma must have priority" (In Categ. 28 8ft.). Olympiodorus abounds in such irrelevancies and speculations. For his comment on the phrase "homonyrna legatai," he borrows heavily, according to his own admission, from Iamblichus' lost commentary. More often that not, Olympiodorus fails to keep his discussion within the boundaries of basic issues. His irrelevancies run the gamut from a Homeric verse to Attic syntax.
Beginning with 31 5, Olympiodorus offers a general treatment of the Aristotelian formulation as a whole. What he says there presents an aspect of special interest. His firstquestion is whether the formulation contains superfluous expressions, especially in view of Aristotle's love for brevity. He draws attention to the importance of each word for the sake of clarity (saph~neias heneka), and also to the fact that Aristotle means to be technical: tb~ ~r 'A?,.~-~o-:~),-~ ~o~o ~:~:o~-rlx~,~ (31 15), Olympiodorus' justification of his claim is not without disappointments. He says that the real reason why Aristotle did not confine his definiens to ~'~ o"~07~ ~6vov xo~v~v was to prevent us from attributing to him the view that all homonyma are also in some sense non-homonyma and all synonyma, non-synonyma. Consider how Plato and Alcibiades, not being synonyma, become so when "man" is predicated of both. Again, if Aristotle had limited his formulation only to "things whose definition is different," then it would be possible to show that it permits us to say absurd things. Consider, e.g., the following: Since genera are predicated synonymously of subordinate species, and since we can give two distinctive accounts of the same individual, say Socrates--viz. (1) "S. animal logical and mortal," (2) "S. bald-headed, philosopher with a protruding belly"---it would turn out that by virtue of the first account Socrates and Alcibiades are synonymous and by force of the second homonymous.
The intriguing thing about all this is that Olympiodorus should call Aristotle's formulation systematic and technical for reasons so foreign to Aristotle's logic and theory of definition. It did not occur to Olympiodorus that Aristotle perhaps did not mean to include as part of his denotation of homonyma the commentators' individuals and their accidental properties. Furthermore it is evident that Olympiodorus did not see that it was only his loose talking about ousia that permitted an indis-.criminate passing back and forth from logos as definition to logos as description.
He is simply committing an error typical of the rest of the commentators. He is on better grounds when he argues in favor of keeping the t~s ousias part in the expression. Without it, he points out, Aristotle would have compromised precision, and the reader would not have been able to say whether the passage is about things or words. Thus in order to avoid any misunderstanding Aristotle distinguishes between words and their definitions on the one hand and things signified by words and the definitions of such substantive things on the other (32 2ft.). Olympiodorus' point is well taken but for one item: his implication that Aristotle is talking about all things in general, for to say so is to cancel the possibility that Aristotle's formulation has a technical side to it. But to realm to Philoponus' defense of L of O, we must admit that it is subtle and ingenious but brings to the foreground issues which, even if not irrelevant to the broader aspects of the problem, cannot be shown to have figured originally in Aristotle's discussion. Finally it must be recognized that his comment on Categories, la 4, indicates that for once he understood correctly the intent of the formulation (37 16-30). Suddenly in this comment all the grammatical trivia, the preoccupation With individuals, proper names, accidental properties, theory of description, and other such notions withdraw to make room for a pointed answer to the real problem. He responds to Aristotle's own 9 illustrations and offers appropriate essential definitions for the kinds of things that are homonyma. Correct though he is on this point, it cannot be said that his 14 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY approach, when seen as a whole, is either unaffected by misconceptions or free from non-Aristotelian presuppositions. 6) Simplicius' interpretation: Simplicius opens his valuable and in many ways highly informative commentary with a remark on the importance of making appropriate distinctions that enable us to classify things signified by words under the fight category. Since it is often the case that two different things may share the same signifying word, we need criteria to distinguish one from the other and to focus attention to the kinds of words that give rise to ambiguity (In Categ. 21 1-10). He observes that if each thing had only one name, then it would come under only one category. But had this been the case, there would have to be as many categories as there are things. However, we know that one and the same name is frequently used to signify a number of substantially different things. Hence the need for categorial classifications arises. He mentions as an example the name "animal" and points out how it is used to signify a man and a horse, or again, Socrates and a painting of Socrates. The manner in which Simplicius discusses the examples is quite significant. He prefers to start with homonymously predicated names rather than homonyma pragmata. Thus since man and horse partake in the substance of animal, the substance is predicated synonymously, and the two things are brought under the same category. But since Socrates and his portrait do not partake of the same substance, Socrates must come under the category of substance, whereas his portrait under that of quality. In order to account for such eases, Simplicius insists, Aristotle found it necessary to begin his treatise with homonyma. "1 Three things must be pointed out here: First, the readiness with which he substitutes his own examples of individual substances for Aristotle's specific ones. Second, his interesting speculation about homonyma as the key to categorial ambiguity, and how this was considered by A_ristofle an item of priority. Third, his diagnostic treatment of the categorial identity of the two homonyma, particularly his prompt classification of the portrait of Socrates under the category of quality, despite the fact that Aristotle's text does not permit such inferences. Evidently by placing the portrait example under quality, Simplicius gives the impression that he is presupposing that Aristotle is using homonyma in the broadest sense---hence sa Simplicius never doubts the usefulness of the discussion on homonyma. He quotes from Iamblichus and Plato's Euthyderaus to show the seriousness of the subject (22 1-9).
Plato, according to Simplicius, had to deal with ambiguity which is due to the lack of proper distinctions in the use of names (22 9-13). The important thing is that Simplicius depends rather heavily on Iamblichus' lost commentary (In Categ. Proemium, 2 10f.) and also refers to Porphyry's work which had already exerted considerable influence on Iamblichus. Simplicius credits Iamblichus for being the first to observe that to kat3gorein is homonymously predicated of the ten categories and that they have the name "category" in common only as a homonymously predicated name. Iamblichus is further reported to have taught that it was only proper for Aristotle to open the Categories with a brief discussion on the nature of horaOnyma. Simplicius is also eager to inform us that there were certain commentators, like Nicostratus and his followers, who had expressed serious reservations about the relevance of the first chapter of the Categories to the main doctrine presented in this treatise. Since we have no reason to doubt the historical accuracy of this information, it is reasonable to say that we can speak with certainty about the existence of two schools opposing each other on the issue of the relevance of the doctrine of homonyma to the rest of Aristotle's categorial theory: the school of Nicostratus on the negative side and the neoplationists Porphyry and Iamblichus defending the other.
non-teclmically--and ousia in a very Ioose sense to mean anything from substance to accidental properties. It is not certain whether Simplicius would have openly endorsed these implications. Regardless of what his reaction would have been, the point is that his treatment of the subject allows such inferences.
When Simplicius turns to examine "the nature of homonyma" (22 14ft.), he repeats the well known views of his predecessors how each thing can be signified through either name or loges, and how the latter means either definition or description. Since names in their symbolic capacity can symbolize substantially different things for which different logoi can be given, and since things which are essentially the same can have a variety of names, we arrive at five types of things; Aristotle, however, treated only three: homonyma, synonyma, paronyma. The other two, polyonyma and heteronyma, were omitted for two reasons: (1) knowledge of them is easily attained as opposites of the first two types; and (2) Aristotle actually had in mind the preparation for speech-making (lectika), rather than an inventory of real things. In offering the second explanation, Simplicius admits he is following Syrianus. His endorsement of that position is intimately related to a more basic issue. He tells us that he agrees with Iamblichus who taught that Aristotle opened the Categories with the homonyma, not only because these are the simplest of expressions, but primarily because the expression "category" is homonymously predicated of the categories (23 25-24 5). One begins to suspect here that the neeplatonic concern for the stratification of species and genera, with the highest genera at the top, is at the back of Simplicius' explanation. What seems also to be true is his interest in pointing out that Aristotle did not assign any reality to the expression "'category" or to "'being." By doing so, Simplicius, like Iamb/ichus from whom he derives this approach, is able to contrast Aristotle's ontology from the neeplatonic theory of Being.
Faithful to the tradition he follows, Simplicius interprets L of O not in the strict sense of definition of ousia. He speculates that Aristotle purposely used the term loges, a broader term, to include in his formulation both the summa genera and the individuals. Only by means of description can we render the property of some substance (29 16-24) . We have already seen how this has become the standard treatment of L of O; hence it would only surprise us to read in Simplicius' account something different on the subject. But in view of his unusual erudition and familiarity with the Categories, we wonder why it never occurred to him to peruse the text merely for the sake of discovering the passages to which he could have appealed for his support of the interpolated meaning of loges as description. Nor did he realize that in order to accommodate this meaning, he was simply following the other commentators when he supplied the very examples which alone could make loges, in the sense of description, applicable to this non-Aristotelian situation. True, Simplicius defends the reading L of O, but he does so for reasons of his own. He appeals to such authorities as Porphyry, Herminus, and "the majority of scholars," but instead of arguing on his own he quotes Porphyry's full approvalJ' 2~ In Categ. 30 5-15. The quotation is most likely from Porphyry's lost work "'Tois pros Gedaleion." Porphyry argues that Aristotle added t~$ ousias in order to leave no doubt about the exact meaning of loges, i.e., definition and description. Without ousia, loges might have also been taken to mean such things as eduction, syllogism, an affatrnation, or a denial.
Even more disappointing is the comment on an aporia that was raised by Nicostratus and Atticus and has to do with the claim that all synonyma are homonyma, and vice versa. Consider, for instance, the fact that there is a sense in which we can say that all homonyma have in common the name by virtue of which they are homonyma, and the definition of the homonymous name. Thus, they are homonyma in that sense. But in so far as they are essentially different things, they are also synonyma. Simplicius informs us that Porphyry resolved the difficulty by pointing out that there is nothing paradoxical about things being synonyma in some context and homonyma in another. Against this background, conspicuously unrelated to Aristotle's major theme, Simplicius proceeds to discuss Porphyry's answer by using the two Ajaxes example. Even later in the next comment, where the opportunity presents itself to focus attention on Aristotle's own examples and identify them correctly, as Ammonius and Olympiodorus at least were able to do, he forgoes it in favor of rehashing such commonplaces of the tropes of homonyma.
All he is able to offer there is to explain why he thinks the Aristotelian examples come under the class of "intended" homonyma due to similarity (31 22-32).
Simplieius is not even original when he misinterprets Aristotle. Aside from depending blindly on Porphyry and repeating characteristic neoplatonie misrepresentations of Aristotle's views, he shows no signs whatever of having suspected the extent to which the doctrine of homonyma was strained to suit the commentators' own intellectual loyalties.
7) Elias" interpretation:
There is hardly anything in Elias' treatment of homonyraa that hag not been said by one of the previous commentators. He shares most of their misconceptions about Aristotle and repeats the same standard errors.
Like the others, he defends the reading L of O and assumes that logos means both definition and description. He begins his commentary by saying why he thinks Aristotle was right in distinguishing between homonyma and synonyma. He argues against certain unnamed thinkers who claimed that all cases of homonyma are reducible to synonyma. He appears familiar with Simplicius' work and echoes the new emphasis this old Porphyrian problem was given by Simplicius. In fact he offers two arguments against the "reductionists," but they present little philosophical interest and have nothing to do with Aristotle's logical views. More interesting is the way in which he understands the Categories. He writes: "Since the main objective is to discuss the categories, and since homonyma is predicated of them, whereas each category is predicated synonymously of the species which come under it in the manner of the genus .... for these reasons Aristotle begins his treatise with the doctrine of homonyma and synonyma. If he gives priority to the former, this is because unity precedes duality" . His comments abound in speculations of the sort. His is a pat explanation, typically neoplatonic and altogether unoriginal. He also ignores Aristotle's examples of homonyma and replaces them with the celebrated ones of the two Ajaxes. But instead of discussing any further the repetitious character of his misinterpretation, we may conclude this account with a note on Elias' original inconsistency.
Elsewhere, viz., in his In Porphyrii lsagogen (56 11-14 and 4 5-11) , he explains in the familiar cliches the difference between definition and description: the former is done with reference to substance, the latter to accidental properties, and is therefore inferior to definition. His discussion of the example of the two Ajaxes as instances of homonymous substances is peculiar, to say the least. He is presumably talking about individual substances, knows that in such cases we cannot have definitions, yet uses the terms description and definition interchangeably as if there were no problem at all (138 19-139 6). The same careless use of terminology we find in his comment on Aristotle's examples. He has just admitted that logos in Aristotle's text means definition and yet writes the following: "The real man is living substance endowed with sensation whereas the portrayed man is not substance but symbeb#kos, not living but lifeless, not sensing but lacking in such faculty; the latter is called 'alive' in the sense of being a representation of a living and sensing substance" (139 25-28) . Why the portrait is not a substance but an accidental thing and why he prefers to ignore Aristotle's text which leaves no doubt that only definitions should be given for both instances of homonyma mentioned, Elias' commentary offers no explanation. The inconsistency remained unnoticed.
III
When we view in retrospect the tradition of Aristotle's interpreters, starting from Elias and going back to the earlier commentators, certain major themes begin to stand out even more pronounced than when we look at these thinkers in the normal chronological order. It seems that these commentators honestly believed they were discussing and logically extending Aristotelian doctrines even after they had seriously departed from Aristotle's thoughts and had in essence abandoned some of his principal views. Whether these thinkers could have developed their philosophies without the use of the method of expounding through commentaries on major texts of the classical period is something that need not be considered here. What has been of concern was the correctness of their interpretations of an Aristotelian issue.
In general, the commentators we discussed were all Platonizing thinkers and, on the whole, well-known professors and teachers. Some of them, like Elias, taught Aristotle as a preliminary to Plato (123 9-11))* Common to all the commentators on the Categories is the noted discrepancy between their ardent defense of the fuller version of the Aristotelian formulation of the nature of homonyma, one which preserves the L o/0 textual reading, and their misunderstanding of the intent of the passage. What is striking about the entire tradition that goes back to Porphyry, if not to others before him, is a common and serious effort to extend Aristotle's views and, in this particular case, to promote the belief that logos meant for Aristotle something more than definition. The persistent preoccupation with the meaning of logos in the sense of description calls for an explanation.
The new meaning the term took was appended to Aristotle's logos with a ~s Elias states that it is necessary for the exegete of Aristotle to =~v~= ti~v=t x& ~otor~tzvor (cf. 110 28-30) . See L. G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam, 1962) , p. xx.
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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY facility that leads one to infer that the commentators were less interested in correctness and more in using some significant text in order to bring to the foreground of their exposition certain concepts of their own. One might venture here the opinion that even more important than the extended meaning of logos was their eagerness to assert the view that would permit ousia, in the sense of individual substances, to become an object of "knowledge" even if admittedly undefinable in terms of Aristotle's logic. This view was asserted, as we saw, by means of an interpretation that rested on certain liberties the commentators took with Aristotle's text. It is difficult to know whether the commentators had actually realized the significance Aristotle had. apparently attached to his way of formulating the nature of homonyma. The fact is that we are allowed to infer that they either ignored or suppressed the ontological and logical aspects of the doctrine and by the same token overlooked the possibility that Aristotle had conceivably stated his case through the aid of technical expressions. It is not easy to say what it was that led the commentators to insist upon treating the two concepts, ousia and logos, in so obviously a non-Aristotelian manner. A fuller explanation of this treatment might eventually reveal that what we have here is doctrinal innovation in late Hellenistic logical theory and comparable developments in ontology. However all we are permitted to say at this point is that no matter what new views the commentators had developed on their own, it is still a fact that they failed to distinguish their own concepts from what their texts permitted.
The interpretation that takes ousia, as it occurs in the first chapter of the Categories, to mean individual substances and that such substances, if they happen to have the same proper name, are cases of homonyma pragmata, goes back, as far as our documents permit us to tell, to the writings of Porphyry and his pupil Iamblichus. We have no extant commentary on the Categories that antedates that of Porphyry. If we had the commentaries from which he was able to draw we might have been in a position to trace the origins of this misinterpretation of Aristotle's text. The way matters now stand, all we can say is that the available evidence points to the fact that the misinterpretation originates with the early neoplatonists, it is transmitted through neoplatonic writers, and becomes an established approach which is shared by all the commentators whose neoplatonie affiliations cannot be doubted. Perhaps the long interpretive tradition from Porphyry to Photius and Psellus which preserved a correct textual reading only to distort its meaning and allow an error to go unnoticed for centuries, is as curious a phenomenon as is the fact that the only commentaries we have on Aristotle's Categories are those that were written by neoplatonists.
